Has multiculturalism failed in Britain? by Heath, A & Demireva, NV
This article was downloaded by: [University of Essex]
On: 17 March 2014, At: 03:54
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
Ethnic and Racial Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20
Has multiculturalism failed in
Britain?
Anthony Heath & Neli Demireva
Published online: 08 Jul 2013.
To cite this article: Anthony Heath & Neli Demireva (2014) Has multiculturalism
failed in Britain?, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37:1, 161-180, DOI:
10.1080/01419870.2013.808754
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.808754
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or
warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any
purpose of the Content. Versions of published Taylor & Francis and Routledge
Open articles and Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open Select articles posted
to institutional or subject repositories or any other third-party website are
without warranty from Taylor & Francis of any kind, either expressed or
implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of merchantability, fitness for
a particular purpose, or non-infringement. Any opinions and views expressed
in this article are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views
of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not
be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor & Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open articles are normally published under a
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0/. However, authors may opt to publish under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Non-Commercial License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc/3.0/ Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open Select articles are currently
published under a license to publish, which is based upon the Creative
Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial No-Derivatives License, but allows for
text and data mining of work. Authors also have the option of publishing an
Open Select article under the Creative Commons Attribution License http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
 
It is essential that you check the license status of any given Open and
Open Select article to confirm conditions of access and use.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 03
:54
 17
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
Has multiculturalism failed in Britain?
Anthony Heath and Neli Demireva
(First submission March 2012; First published July 2013)
Abstract
This paper subjects the criticisms advanced against multiculturalism to
empirical test. It asks whether ethno-religious groups lead ‘parallel lives’
and, in consequence, fail to integrate with the wider society. It looks in
particular at the alleged corrosive effects of multiculturalism, specifically
at the maintenance of an ethnic rather than a British identity, social
distance from white people and willingness to contemplate violent
protest, but finds that all groups alike have displayed major change
across the generations in the direction of a British identity and reduced
social distance. It finds no evidence that rates of intergenerational change
have been slower among ethno-religious groups that have made successful
claims for cultural recognition. In contrast, lower levels of integration are
associated with perceptions of individual or group discrimination.
Keywords: multiculturalism; generations; bonding social capital; social distance;
national identity; violent protest.
Introduction
A widespread belief in western countries is that multiculturalism,
defined as a programme for giving recognition to ethno-religious
groups and their cultures, has failed and is instead leading to the
entrenchment of separate communities with corrosive consequences
for trust and solidarity. This argument has been forcibly expressed by
politicians, with Prime Minister David Cameron (echoing remarks of
German Chancellor Angela Merkel) claiming that:
Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encour-
aged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each
other and apart from the mainstream . . . . We’ve even tolerated
these segregated communities behaving in ways that run com-
pletely counter to our values . . . . This hands-off tolerance has
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only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And
this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the
search for something to belong to and something to believe in
can lead . . . [to] . . . a process of radicalisation. (Cameron 2011)
Similar arguments have been put forward by academics. For example,
Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007, p. 5) have argued that:
Britain and the Netherlands have promoted multiculturalism to
expand opportunities for minorities to enjoy a better life and to
win a respected place of their own in their new society. It is all the
more unfortunate, as our findings will show, that the outcome has
been the opposite  to encourage exclusion rather than inclusion.
Similarly Wolfe and Klausen (2000, p. 29) have claimed that ‘if groups
within the nation state receive greater recognition, it must follow that
conceptions of overarching national solidarity must receive less.’
While there are many different versions of the critique of multi-
culturalism, there is a central core of arguments on which we focus in
this paper. The first step in most critiques such as Cameron’s is the
claim that multicultural policies (MCPs) will tend to foster separate
communities where ethnic groups lead parallel social lives. More
sociologically, the hypothesis is that MCPs promote ‘bonding’ rather
than ‘bridging’ social capital.
The second step in the argument is that these parallel communities
will preserve ethnic norms and values including some (such as the
treatment of women, which is a particular focus of many critics) that
run counter to the norms of the broader society, will inhibit
identification with the broader society, and will hence lead to hostility
and distrust between majority and minority. Thus Barry (2001, p. 88)
has argued that ‘a situation where groups live in parallel universes is
not one well calculated to advance mutual understanding or encourage
the cultivation of habits of co-operation or sentiments of trust.’
The third step is that these separate communities and lack of
identification with the wider society will provide fertile soil for
radicalization. Thus, social segregation was a major theme in the Cantle
(2005, p. 9) report on the disturbances (basically riots) in Oldham,
Burnley and Bradford, and the report emphasized the way in which
social segregation had had adverse implications for conflict and disorder.
A central assumption of many critics is that the problematic
consequences of MCPs will apply particularly to Muslims. As we
shall see, in Britain some Muslim communities do indeed have high
rates of in-group marriage and of course the 7/7 bombings were
carried out by young British-born Muslims. However, many of the
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arguments would seem to apply equally to the case of Sikhs, who have
won some notable battles, for example over the right to wear the
turban, for cultural recognition.
A second key but implicit assumption is that MCPs will entrench
these patterns of parallel lives across generations. New migrants tend
to rely on their ethnic communities for social, emotional and practical
support, and we might expect this tendency to be greater for groups
whose members do not speak English or experience other barriers to
social integration. However, critics of multiculturalism are implicitly
making a stronger claim than simply that new migrants from certain
origins will turn to their ethnic communities for support. They imply
that MCPs will entrench this tendency and maintain the strong
inward-looking communities across time and generations, thus
preserving ‘bright’ boundaries between minorities and the wider
society.
Another key assumption is that bonding social capital, and an
emphasis on preserving communities’ traditional practices, is incom-
patible with bridging social capital or a commitment to British values.
They are seen to be mutually exclusive ‘either/or’ phenomena.
Similarly, there is also an implicit assumption that segregation or
assimilation are the only possibilities. A helpful framework for
analysing this is provided by Berry (1992), who argues that there are
two important issues that individuals and groups confront in culturally
diverse societies. The first relates to the maintenance of one’s own
cultural identity and the second relates to the nature of relationships
with the wider society. This leads Berry to present a fourfold typology
of ‘acculturation options’, namely assimilation, integration, separation
and marginalization, which we reproduce in Figure 1.
So the critics are essentially concerned that some groups, notably
those that have been given the benefit of MCPs, may be entrenched in
the bottom-left cell of Berry’s diagram (Figure 1), and that radicals
Figure 1 Four acculturation strategies
Is it considered to be of value to 
maintain cultural identity and 
characteristics?
Yes No
Yes Integration AssimilationIs it considered to be 
of value to maintain 
relationships with 
other groups?
No Separation/Segregation Marginalization
Source: Berry 1992.
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and extremists will emerge from groups located in this cell. A counter
expectation is that in a liberal society such as Britain, which has
implemented a ‘thin’ version of multiculturalism, the normal pattern
would be for groups to occupy the top-left cell with positive
orientations both to their ethnic culture and to the wider society,
and with dual identities rather than exclusively ethnic or British ones.
But even if we were to find that some groups were entrenched in the
bottom-left cell, this would not necessarily indicate that MCPs were
responsible. An alternative hypothesis is that the wider society’s
treatment of minorities might drive some groups into this category.
Theories of discrimination and reactive ethnicity thus become an
alternative explanation for entrenchment and corrosion.
There has been relatively little empirical research on these issues.
Some studies such as those of Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) and
Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) have explored the effects of MCPs on
the majority population (or in Kesler and Bloemraad’s case, on the
population as a whole), reaching very different conclusions from each
other. However, our focus is on the effects on the minority population,
which has been a particular concern of the critics.
One major study of the effects on the foreign-born population is
that of Koopmans (2010), who focuses on three indicators of socio-
economic integration (economic activity, residential segregation and
over-representation in the prison population) in five European
countries. He finds that immigrants to Britain score relatively well
on two of these outcomes, but attributes this to Britain’s rather lean
social security system. He suggests that it is the combination of a
generous social security system and MCPs that is particularly harmful
to immigrant integration. In another major cross-national study
focusing on foreign-born populations, Wright and Bloemraad (2012)
look at the effects of MCPs on measures of social inclusion, political
inclusion and political integration. They find that countries with
stronger MCPs do not have worse outcomes with respect to these
aspects of immigrant incorporation. They also find some suggestions
that the combination of MCPs with high access to citizenship may
have positive effects on some outcomes such as trust, although they
admit that the evidence is somewhat equivocal.
While Wright and Bloemraad’s concerns come closest to our own,
they (like Koopmans) limit themselves to foreign-born populations
rather than to the second or later generations. Our contention is that
there may be many reasons why the foreign-born, particularly those
who migrate as adults, might show some of the characteristics that
critics object to. Thus high levels of ethnic, rather than British identity,
might be natural among those who may intend to return home or who
may not have lived long enough in Britain to be eligible for citizenship.
The key test, we believe, is whether such lack of integration is
164 Anthony Heath and Neli Demireva
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entrenched across generations. Following standard accounts of gen-
erational change (e.g. Alba and Nee 1999), we would expect the second
and later generations to have higher levels of integration. The key
question for us is whether MCPs inhibit this ‘normal’ process of social
and political integration across generations.
We focus on three aspects that critics have emphasized: identifica-
tion with Britain, hostility towards or lack of sympathy with the
mainstream, and political radicalization. While a comparative research
design would have been ideal, lack of comparative data sets with the
requisite second-generation samples makes this very difficult. Instead
we focus on a comparison within Britain between groups that have
been given more and less cultural recognition. Broadly speaking,
ethno-religious groups such as Muslims and Sikhs have asked for, and
received, exemptions from standard British rules (such as provisions
for halal meat for Muslims or wearing the turban for Sikhs). The 2006
Racial and Religious Hatred Act and the 2006 Equality Act, which
outlawed discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, also
addressed the concerns of faith groups, particularly following Muslim
concerns after the Salman Rushdie affair. In contrast, black groups
have tended to make claims for anti-discrimination measures (see
Statham 1999, Table 7, p. 617), which, following Barry, we do not treat
as multicultural demands1 (and which also apply across the board and
not just to blacks).
The central questions that we address in this paper, therefore, are
whether there has been the expected intergenerational shift away from
parallel lives and separate cultures and towards the British main-
stream, or whether parallel lives and separate cultures have become
entrenched across generations among those ethno-religious groups
such as Sikhs and Muslims who have received state support for their
cultural concerns. Our aim is not to debate the philosophical
arguments about the justification of multiculturalism but to assess
empirically whether or not the corrosion anticipated by the critics has
actually occurred in Britain. We focus on the effects on the minorities
rather than on the corrosive effects on the majority group (which
would need a different research design).
The plan of the article is as follows. After describing our data and
the key variables, we begin with descriptive results, charting differences
across generations in the extent to which different ethno-religious
minorities lead parallel lives. We then investigate the alleged corrosive
effects of parallel lives, looking at changes across generations in value
orientations, identification with Britain, social distance from the
majority group, and willingness to support violent protest. We then
model the data and test whether patterns of generational change differ
between ethno-religious groups and whether levels or rates of change
are related to experiences or perceptions of exclusion and prejudice.
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 03
:54
 17
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
Data and measures
Our data come from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey
(EMBES). EMBES provides a representative probability sample of the
major established ethnic minorities in Britain  namely people of
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black African
background. The design was a clustered, stratified sample with areas
of high ethnic minority density being over-sampled and areas with the
lowest density (B 2 per cent ethnic minorities) being excluded for cost
reasons. (In order to adjust for this over-sampling, descriptive statistics
are weighted, while in the statistical modelling we control for ethnic
density.) Addresses were screened for the presence of ethnic minority
individuals. The achieved sample size was 2,787 respondents with a
response rate between 58 and 62 per cent, depending on the method of
treating ‘unknowns’ in the screening process. The study was funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the Electoral
Commission was a collaborating partner in this research. For further
technical details and for the full questionnaire, see Howat et al. (2011).
Two key variables in this paper are ethno-religious group and
generation. We next describe how we constructed these variables.
Details of the further variables used in the analysis are given in
Appendix 1.
Ethno-religious group
We constructed a combined ethno-religious variable since the Indian
and black African groups are highly heterogeneous in ways that are
relevant to MCPs. We therefore distinguish within the Indian group
between those who are Hindu, Sikh, Muslim or belong to other or no
religions. This is because Sikhs can legitimately claim to be an ethnic
group in their own right and because a great deal of the multi-
culturalism debate has focused on Muslims.
We also distinguish within the black African group between
Muslims and those who belong to other religions  largely Christian.
Ideally, if sample size permitted, we would make further distinctions,
particularly between Pentecostal, Anglican and Catholic Christians,
and between different language groups. There are further ethnic or
linguistic differences within our other ethno-religious groups too. For
example, within the group of Pakistani background one could
distinguish Urdu, Sindhi and Pashto speakers. We should note that
the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups do contain small numbers
(around 5 per cent) who are not Muslim, but there are too few to
permit a sensible distinction in our data set.
166 Anthony Heath and Neli Demireva
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Generation
We have found it helpful to distinguish between a ‘first generation’,
who were born abroad and arrived as adults at age sixteen or older, a
‘1.5 generation’ who were also born abroad but migrated before age
sixteen, and a ‘second generation ’ who were born in Britain and
which also includes the small number of third-generation individuals
whose parents were born in Britain. For simplicity, we shall refer to
this latter category simply as the second generation.
The broad rationale for making these distinctions is that the first
generation, thus defined, will have received most or all of their
education in the country of origin and will have been socialized into
origin-country values and identities. In contrast, the 1.5 generation
will have received some or all of their education in Britain and will
have had more exposure to British values in their formative years.
Finally, the second generation will have received all their education in
Britain and will in almost all cases (99 per cent in our sample) be
British citizens. We should note that the black Caribbean group has
the highest percentage in the second generation, whereas the black
African groups, being the most recent arrivals in Britain, are
predominantly first generation. This further means that for some
analyses it is not sensible to report percentages for the second-
generation black African groups: if the base frequency is less than
twenty respondents, we do not report percentages.
Descriptive findings
We begin with the claim that minorities live parallel lives and that this
will be entrenched across generations. In Table 1 we show the
percentages of our main ethno-religious groups who have a co-ethnic
partner, who belong to a voluntary association whose members are
mainly co-ethnic, whose friends are mainly co-ethnic, who attend a
place of worship comprised mainly of co-ethnic worshippers, whose
neighbours are mainly co-ethnic, and who work at a firm where
colleagues are mainly co-ethnic. In each column we show the
percentage for the first generation followed by the change between
the first and second generations. Changes that are statistically
significant at the .05 level are highlighted. (For simplicity we exclude
the 1.5 generation, although they are included in our modelling later in
the paper.)
We have arranged Table 1 according to the strength of the ‘bonding’
tendency in the first generation. Thus, we see the highest levels of in-
group choice occurring with respect to partnership, where around 90
per cent of the married/cohabiting members of the first generation
partner co-ethnics. (Many of these marriages will have been formed in
Has multiculturalism failed in Britain? 167
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Table 1 Generational change in social life (percentages; 1st generation on the left and 1st2nd generation change on the right of each
column)
Co-ethnic
partner
Association
members
mainly
co-ethnic
Friends
mainly
co-ethnic
Fellow
worshippers
mainly
co-ethnic
Neighbours
mainly
co-ethnic
Workmates
mainly
co-ethnic
Bangladeshi 100 11* 87 10 62 13 52 6 26 12* 37 18
Pakistani 96 2 74 0 61 6 71 13* 35 4 40 23*
Indian Sikh 95 2 96 14* 65 22* 91 4 15 0 36 15*
Indian Hindu 96 0 82 7 60 18* 82 9 16 6 16 6
Indian Muslim 88 11   75 24* 62 3 17 20  
Black African Muslim 92  64  53  26  13 1 18 10
Other black African 88  68 4 56 28* 43 8 7 2 18 15*
Black Caribbean 81 29* 70 3 53 14* 36 3 10 3 8 1
All minorities 92 11* 77 3 57 15* 52 6* 18 2 24 12*
* pB.05 (weighted)
Note: Percentages not reported where nB20. The base excludes non-partnered (column 1), non-members of associations or religions (columns 2 and 4) and non-
workers (column 6).
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the country of origin before migration.) Associational membership
tends to be predominantly with co-ethnics in the first generation and
there are also high levels of in-group friendship and of attendance at
predominantly co-ethnic places of worship. In-group choice is much
lower for residential neighbourhoods and workplaces. We have
checked the self-reported figures for residential segregation against
official (2001) census figures of the ethnic composition of the areas
where our first-generation respondents lived. The figures tally
remarkably well.2
It is also striking that the south Asian groups generally show greater
co-ethnic choice with respect to partners, friends, church and
associational involvement than do the black groups. This applies to
Sikhs and Hindus as well as to Muslim Indians, Pakistanis and
Bangladeshi, while black African Muslims show lower levels of co-
ethnic choice.
As to entrenchment across the generations, the pattern is not
straightforward. There is a modest increase in the extent of attendance
at predominantly co-ethnic places of worship.3 We see little change
with respect to participation in ethnic associations or residential
concentration. In contrast there is greater mixing across the genera-
tions in friendship and at work, and there are also significant increases
in intermarriage. Furthermore, despite different starting levels in the
first generation, the direction of change is broadly similar in all ethno-
religious groups.
In Table 2 we then turn to minorities’ value orientations and
attitudes. We asked two questions, designed to tap the two dimensions
of Berry’s typology of acculturation strategies, on the desirability of
maintaining ethnic values and beliefs, and of mixing and integrating.
We also included a question, asked only of Muslims, on the desirability
of having sharia courts (an indicator of a desire for separatism) and
another on support for traditional gender roles.
The most striking aspect of Table 2 is that minorities over-
whelmingly support maintenance of their own ethnic customs and
traditions alongside equally striking support for mixing and inte-
grating. That is, minorities have positive orientations to the cultures
of both origin and destination countries (thus occupying the
integrationist cell of Berry’s typology). This is equally true of all
groups, south Asian and black, Muslim and Christian alike.
Furthermore there is no generational change here to speak of.
Most members of all ethnic groups, both in the first and second
generations, have positive orientations towards both minority and
majority cultures. Only around 5 per cent occupy the bottom-left
separationist cell of Berry’s typology and these are outnumbered by
10 per cent in the top-right assimilationist cell.
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Table 2 Generational change in attitudes and orientations (percentages; 1st generation on the left and 1st2nd generation change on the
right of each column)
Minorities
should maintain
own values
Minorities should
mix and integrate
Sharia law should
apply to all cases
Husband should
work and wife stay
at home
Bangladeshi 85 2 93 5 19 3 16 2
Pakistani 88 7 92 1 19 3 38 21*
Indian Sikh 92 0 99 4 N/A 15 0
Indian Hindu 87 5 93 6* N/A 19 6
Indian Muslim 7 7 90 0 21 16*  
Black African Muslim 80  91  16  32 
Other black African 74 12 91 3 N/A 21 
Black Caribbean 82 1 97 4 N/A 26 14
All minorities 83 1 93 0 19 0 26 11*
* pB .05 (weighted)
Note: Percentages not reported where nB20. Gender role question asked in mail-back supplement; sharia question asked only of Muslims.
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Similarly, support for separatism as indexed by the question on
sharia courts, amounts to just one fifth of Muslims. To be sure, critics
of multiculturalism might be worried that the figure is as high as one
fifth, and it would be wrong to deny that some support for separatism
does exist  just as we could not deny that there is some white British
support for ethnic exclusionism.
We also find some support for traditional gender roles, although
even in the first generation only a minority of respondents favour the
patriarchal model. Moreover, for the two groups where we have large
second-generation samples  Pakistanis and black Caribbeans  there
is clear evidence of convergence with the white British figure (14 per
cent agreement with the patriarchal statement).
So this is a very different picture from Table 1 on social relationships.
Whereas there we saw high levels of bonding social capital and social
involvement with co-ethnics, in Table 2 we see positive orientations
towards mixing and integrating, and low levels of support for separat-
ism. One of the key assumptions of the critics of multiculturalism,
namely that high levels of bonding social capital would lead to
unwillingness to integrate, does not therefore appear to be well-founded.
We next turn to feelings of British or ethnic identity, hostility
towards integration with whites (as indexed by a classic ‘social
distance’ question on attitudes towards intermarriage) and finally, a
measure of willingness to engage in a violent protest ‘if the British
government was about to start a war that you didn’t agree with’. These
are three key outcomes and represent our best indicators of whether
corrosion has in fact been occurring.
In the case of British identity and social distance from white people
we see major changes across generations in the direction of greater
integration. Thus we see high levels of British identity even in the first
generation, and these levels are higher still in the second generation,
with significant increases among Pakistanis and the three Indian
groups. We also see much reduced hostility to marriage with a white
person in the second generation, although there is no decline, and
indeed some increase overall, in willingness to support violent protest.
However, as Sanders and his colleagues show in their paper in this
special issue, the overall level of support for violent protest in the
second generation is no different from that of white respondents.
In summary:
. High levels of bonding social capital coexist with positive
orientations towards integration, high levels of British identity
and low levels of hostility to white people.
. Intergenerational change is faster for some measures than for
others  it is fastest for British identity, slowest for bonding social
capital.
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. The overwhelming majority of all ethno-religious groups show
positive orientations both towards their own ethnic culture and
towards integration into British society. Only a small minority
take a separatist position, rejecting a British identity, supporting
sharia law or supporting violence.
Modelling the data
One possibility is that some of the apparent intergenerational
differences observed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are due to confounding
factors such as the differing age distributions of the generations. For
example, young men may be more inclined to support violent protests,
and so the apparent increase in the second generation may simply be a
consequence of the younger profile of this generation. Second, we need
to check whether the rates of intergenerational change in our key
outcome measures are consistent across the different ethnic groups: do
groups such as Sikhs and Muslims show a slower rate of generational
change than other groups who have not asked for or received MCPs?
Third, is the potential support for violent protest observed in Table 3
related to experiences of discrimination and a sense of social injustice
rather than to multiculturalism?
We focus on three outcomes: preferring a black or Asian identity to
a British one, social distance from white people, and support for
violent protest. For each outcome we fit three models. The first
Table 3 Generational change in identity, social distance and support for violent
protest (percentages; 1st generation on the left and 1st2nd generation change
on the right of each column)
Feel equally
or more
British than
black/Asian
Bothered
about
marriage with
white person
Might
support
violent protest
against war
Pakistani 67 18* 30 17* 6 13*
Bangladeshi 63 12 20 7 8 10*
Indian Sikh 56 30* 25 17* 14 2
Indian Hindu 54 18* 18 13* 6 1
Indian Muslim 63 32* 18 16 13 8
Black African Muslim 55  11  3 
Other black African 48 11 14 2 8 10*
Black Caribbean 51 8 10 4 6 1
All minorities 57 22* 18 10* 7 5*
* pB .05 (weighted)
Note: Percentages not reported where nB20.
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includes demographics (age, educational level, gender, generation and
marital status) as well as our ethno-religious group measure. (We also
experimented with numerous other potential confounding variables
such as citizenship, fluency in English, income source and social class
but none of these proved to be consistent predictors, although
speaking a language other than English at home was positively related
to having an ethnic identity.) We control throughout for percentage co-
ethnics in the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) in order to take
account of the over-sampling in high-density areas.
In the second model we test formally whether rates of intergenera-
tional change differ across the nine ethno-religious groups. In the third
model we then include various mediating variables, focusing on the key
variables identified in Table 1, together with measures of personal
experience of discrimination and feelings that their ethnic group is
held back by discrimination. We need to recognize, however, that we
cannot be sure in cross-sectional research whether the ‘mediating’
variables genuinely have a causal role: it is always possible that, for
example, an ethnic identity leads one to join an ethnic association,
rather than the other way round. In order to gauge the substantive
magnitude of these associations, in Table 4 we show the average
marginal effects, which can be interpreted straightforwardly as the
change in the probability of the outcome occurring.
Considering identity first, we can see from model 1 that a black or
Asian identity is negatively associated with age (i.e. younger people are
more likely to adopt a black or Asian identity). After controlling for
age, we find that the second generation is markedly more likely to feel
British than the first generation (up by 25 percentage points), with the
1.5 generation in between. It is also notable that it is not the Muslim
groups but the black groups, especially those of black Caribbean
heritage, who are least likely to feel British and most likely to adopt a
black identity. In model 2 we then test whether rates of generational
change vary across ethno-religious groups (i.e. we tested for interac-
tion effects). The improvement in fit when these interactions were
introduced was not significant (overall change in x211.93 with 8 d.f.,
p.20), while only one of the individual terms was significant  that
for other black Africans, who showed a slower rate of intergenera-
tional change.
In model 3 we then introduce mediating variables to see how far
ethno-religious or generational differences can be explained by
differences in bonding social capital or experiences of discrimination.
Our measures of bonding social capital are co-ethnic friendship,
neighbours, places of worship and ethnic associations. Of these
variables, membership of a co-ethnic association has the strongest
association with a black or Asian identity.
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Table 4 Logistic regression of identity, social distance and support for violent protest (average marginal effects)
Feels more black/Asian
than British
Bothered about
marriage to white
person
Might support violent
protest against war
Model 1 Model 3 Model 1 Model 3 Model 1 Model 3
Ethno-religious group
Pakistani (ref)
Bangladeshi 0.07* 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00
Indian Sikh 0.08* 0.05 0.07** 0.08* 0.04 0.02
Indian Hindu 0.11** 0.10** 0.09** 0.08** 0.01 0.02
Indian Muslim 0.02 0.01 0.09* 0.08 0.02 0.02
Other Indian 0.05 0.03 0.12** 0.13** 0.00 0.00
Black African Muslim 0.13*** 0.14** 0.10* 0.11** 0.02 0.03
Other black African 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.05 0.04** 0.02
Black Caribbean 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.03* 0.04
Generation
1st (ref)
1.5 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06*** 0.05***
2nd  0.25*** 0.27*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.05***
Age (ln) 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.04 0.04 0.08** 0.09**
Gender 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03** 0.03**
Married 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 0.00
Education 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.00 0.00
Interactions between generation and ethno-religious group NS NS NS
Co-ethnic friends 0.03** 0.02 0.00
Co-ethnic neighbours 0.01 0.01 0.01
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Table 4 (Continued )
Feels more black/Asian
than British
Bothered about
marriage to white
person
Might support violent
protest against war
Model 1 Model 3 Model 1 Model 3 Model 1 Model 3
Co-ethnic worship 0.02 0.01 0.02
Co-ethnic association 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05**
Group discrimination 0.25*** 0.06 0.10***
Individual discrimination 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.00
Percentage co-ethnic (ln) 0.06 0.04 0.11** 0.09* 0.01 0.00
Index of multiple deprivation (ln) 0.08 0.03 0.04
N 2,552 2,552 2,537 2,537 2,520 2,520
* pB.05, ** pB.01, *** pB.001 (unweighted)
Note: Models run in STATA with robust standard errors. The average marginal effects (AME) report the change in the dependent variable computed at different
values of the x variables and then averaged across the different values. For dummy variables, the marginal effect shows by how much the probability of the
outcome is predicted to change as x changes from 0 to 1 holding all other explanatory variables equal. For ordinal variables, the AME report the predicted
change for an increase in x of one unit. For the continuous variables, we report the difference between the probability of the outcome occurring for the lowest
and highest value that the variable can take.
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We also include measures of reported individual and group
discrimination. As we can see, both forms of discrimination increase
one’s likelihood of feeling black or Asian rather than British, with
perceptions that the group is held back by discrimination proving to be
more important than any of our other predictors except age and
generation (a difference of 25 percentage points between those who are
most aware and those least aware of group discrimination).
Turning next to social distance, we again see considerable genera-
tional progress. However, the ethno-religious differences are almost the
exact opposite of those found for identity. In the case of social
distance, we find that the black groups are much less bothered about
intermarriage with a white person than are the south Asian groups,
with people of Pakistani background showing the highest level of
concern. In other words, despite their lesser acceptance of a British
identity, black groups show a greater acceptance of white people.
As with identity, the introduction of interaction terms between
ethno-religious group and generation does not improve fit (change in
x210.31 with 8 d.f., p.25), and again it is the other black Africans
who show the slowest rate of intergenerational change. Our mediating
variables, too, operate in much the same way as with identity; model 3
shows that membership of a co-ethnic association and perceptions of
individual and group discrimination are associated with greater social
distance from white people’’.
Finally we turn to support for violent protest. Here we get a
different pattern. The generational trend, albeit modest in size
(a change of only 5 percentage points between the first and second
generations), is towards greater support for protest. Furthermore,
unlike identity and social distance, there are no significant ethno-
religious differences in support for violent protest: in particular,
Muslims show no greater support for violence than do other south
Asians or blacks. Nor is there any sign that rates of generational
change differed between ethno-religious groups. The introduction of
the interaction terms once again did not improve fit (change in x2
7.84 with 8 d.f., p.25) and none of the individual terms approached
significance.
However, support for violent protest is associated with perceptions
of group discrimination (a 10 percentage-point difference), as is
membership of ethnic associations (5 percentage points). However,
both these ‘effects’ are substantively rather small and we should
therefore be careful not to exaggerate the importance of ethnic
organizations or generational change as a source of violent protest.
The other distinguishing characteristics of people who might be
prepared to engage in violent protest are that they are young and
male. This profile almost certainly fits white British protesters too and
probably has nothing to do with Muslim or ethnic radicalization.
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Conclusions
The first lesson to be drawn from our evidence is that bonding social
capital does not have the adverse consequences anticipated by the
critics. On the one hand, it is true that some south Asian groups,
particularly those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, do
exhibit high levels of in-group marriage and friendship, but they do
not lead parallel lives since residential and workplace segregation is
actually rather low. We also find that people of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi background are the most likely to feel bothered about
intermarriage but on the other hand they are no more inclined to reject
integration into British society, to reject a British identity, or to
contemplate violent protest than are other ethno-religious groups.
Indeed, it is the black groups who are the most likely to reject a British
identity, while there are no significant ethnic differences in the
propensity to contemplate violent protest. In short, high levels of in-
group marriage and friendship are compatible with the adoption of a
British identity and a positive orientation towards British society. As
Table 4 showed, the only one of the ‘bonding’ measures that
consistently predicts our three outcomes is membership of an ethnic
organization.
The second lesson to be drawn is that intergenerational changes do
not fall into a neat pattern with Muslim and Sikh groups being more
entrenched than the black groups. If anything, it was the other black
African group that showed the slowest rate of intergenerational change.
There was no sign in our data that the groups that had made successful
claims for recognition of their cultural practices, such as Sikhs and
Muslims, had made slower intergenerational progress towards integra-
tion. The implication is that MCPs have played little part in the story.
A third lesson is that perceived discrimination (both individual and
group) has some of the strongest effects on negative outcomes.
Discrimination is at least as plausible an explanation as multi-
culturalism for lack of integration. In this respect our results are
consistent with those found by Maxwell (2009), who has shown (using
a quite different data set) the importance of perceived discrimination
for lack of British identification.
Overall, our results paint a rather optimistic picture of ethnic
minority integration in Britain. In this respect, our results are
consistent with those of Koopmans (2010) and of Wright and
Bloemraad (2012), both of whom show that migrants in Britain
compare relatively favourably with those in other countries on various
measures of social and political integration. Like Wright and
Bloemraad, we have found no evidence that MCPs have had negative
effects on social integration: the similarity of rates of intergenerational
change for the different ethno-religious groups, albeit from rather
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different starting points, suggests that we are seeing in Britain general
processes of intergenerational integration that have little to do with
specific MCPs. As Wright and Bloemraad (2012, p. 88) argue:
Academic research tends to downplay null findings, but in this
case these findings carry enormous theoretical and policy
significance: the most important rationale for the political
backlash against multicultural policies  that they impede or
hurt socio-political integration  appears unfounded empirically.
We are in complete agreement.
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Notes
1. While Banting and Kymlicka (2004) include affirmative action policies as one of the
components of their index of MCPs, we do not regard anti-discrimination policies as falling
within the definition of MCPs since they do not focus on cultural rights but aim to ensure
simply that minorities achieve the same opportunities as do the majority population.
2. According to the 2001 census, the co-ethnic proportion in the LSOAs where our first-
generation Caribbeans lived was 9 per cent. The corresponding figures were 14 per cent for
Bangladeshis, 22 per cent for Sikhs and 23 per cent for Pakistanis.
3. This may be because the size of the different ethno-religious communities has grown
and it has thus been easier for the second generation to attend an ethnic mosque rather than
a mixed one. It is also possible that the second generation have a different interpretation of
our question that refers to ‘ethnic background’.
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Appendix 1. Definitions of variables used in Table 4
Independent variable
Age Natural logarithm of age
Gender 0male; 1female
Married 0not married; 1married/cohabiting
Education 0none; 1low; 2GCSE; 3A-level;
4degree
Generation 01st generation; 11.5 generation; 22nd
generation plus
Ethno-religious group 0Pakistani; 1Bangladeshi; 2Indian Sikh;
3Indian Hindu; 4Indian Muslim; 5other
Indian; 6black African Muslim; 7other black
African; 8black Caribbean
Co-ethnic friends ‘As far as you know, how many of your friends have the
same ethnic background as you?’
5all of them; 4  most of them; 3about half of
them / don’t know; 2a few of them; 1none of
them
Co-ethnic neighbours ‘As far as you know, how many of the people in your
neighbourhood have the same ethnic background as
you?’
5all of them; 4  most of them; 3about half of
them / don’t know; 2a few of them; 1none of
them
Co-ethnic association 0does not participate in any association or
participates in non-ethnic association;
1participates in ethnic association
Co-ethnic worship 0not a church member or non-ethnic church
member; 1member of co-ethnic church
Individual discrimination 0not experienced race discrimination;
1experienced race discrimination
Group discrimination ‘There is a big gap between what people from my ethnic
group expect to get out of life and what they receive.’
‘Non-white people don’t have the same opportunities
and chances in life as white people, as they are held
back by prejudice and discrimination.’ Both items
recoded so that
1strongly disagree; 2disagree; 3don’t know /
neither agree nor disagree; 4agree;
5strongly agree. Scores summed.
Percentage co-ethnic Natural logarithm of percentage co-ethnics in the
LSOA
Index of multiple deprivation Natural logarithm of the index of multiple deprivation
Dependent variable
Social distance How bothered if a close family member married a
white person: 0not at all / not very much / a little /
no opinion; 1rather a lot / a great deal
Feel more black/Asian than
British
0equally (black/Asian) and British / more British
than (black/Asian) / British not (black/Asian) / other
answers; 1(black/Asian) not British / more (black/
Asian) than British
Might support violent protest
against war
0no / don’t know; 1yes
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